Economic Interdependence and Peace in Transitional Democracies by Wooten, Alexander
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
CUREJ - College Undergraduate Research
Electronic Journal College of Arts and Sciences
5-1-2007
Economic Interdependence and Peace in
Transitional Democracies
Alexander Wooten
University of Pennsylvania, awooten@sas.upenn.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/curej
Part of the Political Science Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/curej/70
For more information, please contact libraryrepository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wooten, Alexander, "Economic Interdependence and Peace in Transitional Democracies" 01 May
2007. CUREJ: College Undergraduate Research Electronic Journal, University of Pennsylvania,
http://repository.upenn.edu/curej/70.
Economic Interdependence and Peace in Transitional Democracies
Abstract
The primary aim of this paper is to explore the extent to which economic interdependence influences the
likelihood that a transitional democracy will enter into an armed conflict. The paper demonstrates that
economic interdependence is a primary means of avoiding conflict during democratic transition. The
concerns of the transitional democratic peace theorists are incorporated into an economic interdependence
framework to provide a coherent policy prescription that advocates both democracy and interdependence.
The best circumstances for democratization are those in which countries are interdependent with their
neighbors. As an exploration of this hypothesis two cases are explored; one with a complete absence of
interdependence and another with a high degree thereof. The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the
early 1990s provides an example of a war between democratizing countries with no interdependence, while
the relationship between Brazil and Argentina displayed increased interdependence without precipitating war.
The paper is divided into two sections, with the first defining the terms of the argument, and exploring the
existing theories of interdependence, conflict and democracy. The second section of the paper highlights two
cases which underscore the importance of economic interdependence during transitions to democracy. A
conclusion comparing the cases and highlighting the need for interdependence follows.
Keywords
Economic Interdependence, Democratic Peace Theory, Social Sciences, Political Science, Edward Mansfield,
Mansfield, Edward
Disciplines
Political Science
This article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/curej/70
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economic Interdependence and Peace  
in Transitional Democracies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alexander Wooten 
March 28, 2007 
University of Pennsylvania 
Senior Thesis 
Advisor: Professor Edward Mansfield 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION: THE PURSUIT OF INTERNATIONAL STABILITY........................................... 3
 
THEORY 
 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PRIMARY THEORIES: ....................................................................... 11 
HOW TO MEASURE INTERDEPENDENCE? ..................................................................................... 15 
HOW TO MEASURE CONFLICT? ........................................................................................................ 18 
TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACY & THEORY OF THE STATE ....................................................... 20 
OVERVIEW OF THE EXISTING LITERATURE AND CASE STUDY APPROACH..................... 24 
CRITERIA FOR CASE STUDY SELECTION: ..................................................................................... 27 
 
CASE STUDIES 
 
ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN- IMMINENT CONFLICT IN THE ABSENCE OF 
INTERDEPENDENCE.............................................................................................................................. 33 
      HISTORICAL OVERVIEW ............................................................................................................... 34
      DEMOCRATIZATION ....................................................................................................................... 35
      THE NAGARNO-KHARABAKH CONFLICT: OVERDETERMINED ....................................... 39
      ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN: HINDSIGHT AND FUTURE.................................................... 47
 
ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL:  TENSIONS SUPPRESSED BY INTERDEPENDENCE................... 47 
      HISTORY OF ARGENTINE-BRAZILIAN RELATIONS AND DEMOCRATIZATION .......... 48
      ARGENTINE AND BRAZILIAN INTERDEPENDENCE: PREEMPTING CONFLICT........... 53
      ARGENTINE-BRAZILIAN HORIZONS.......................................................................................... 63
 
CONCLUSIONS: INTERDEPENDENCE AS A PACIFIST PROMOTER......................................... 64 
 
APPENDIX 1- ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN .................................................................................... 70 
APPENDIX 2 – BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA ........................................................................................ 74 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................................................... 78 
 
 
 2
Introduction: The Pursuit of International Stability 
 
The primary aim of this paper is to explore the extent to which economic 
interdependence influences the likelihood that a transitional democracy will enter into an 
armed conflict. The paper will endeavor to demonstrate that economic interdependence is 
a primary means of avoiding conflict during democratic transition.  The concerns of the 
transitional democratic peace theorists will be incorporated into an economic 
interdependence framework to provide a coherent policy prescription that advocates both 
democracy and interdependence.  The best circumstances for democratization are those in 
which countries are interdependent with their neighbors. 
The striking economic globalization and the number of armed conflicts that have 
characterized the preliminary years of the new century underscore an international need 
for peace and stability.  As a world power, the United States’ interests in promoting 
world peace are manifold.  The promotion of the proliferation of peaceful regimes 
throughout the world is clearly one of the primary aims of United States foreign policy in 
the 21st century, as well as the goal of countless non governmental organizations.  
Transnational corporations have vested interests in promoting peace for economic gain, 
while the establishment of peace forms a cornerstone of national security policies.  
Questions concerning the future of potentially democratic countries such as Iraq and 
Afghanistan are immediately relevant to United States foreign policy.  The effects of 
promoting peace in countries all around the world cannot be understated.  “There is a 
need to establish the principle of permanent interdependence between rich and poor 
regions of the planet”.1  Although peace is acknowledged as a desirable end goal, the 
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policy prescriptions vary wildly.  These differences result from divergent views of how 
stable peace is best promoted. 
The Kantian origins of the theory that democratic citizens “will have great 
hesitation in embarking on so dangerous an enterprise [as war]”2 have been substantiated 
by contemporary statistical analysis.  Several scholars have argued that democracies 
never go to war with other democracies.  This claim, now known as the Democratic 
Peace Theory (DPT), has also been heavily contested by numerous academics and 
theoreticians.  Many studies have been conducted with the aim of proving or disproving 
this hypothesis.  Though no universal consensus has been reached, sufficient scholarly 
support exists for the theory to justify its consideration as a valid hypothesis.  The 
disagreements about the validity of the Democratic Peace underscore a fundamental 
theoretical dispute between the liberal and realist positions.  Realists advance arguments 
that claim that states act as rational agents in the international arena, while liberals claim 
that groups within society actually steer policy.  The democratic peace theory itself has 
also gained particular credence from scholars who qualify it by restricting its application 
to specific contexts, such as stable, industrialized, and western countries. 
Not all democratic peace theorists support the universal acceptance of the theory 
and as a result several interpretations have emerged.  One of the most intriguing concerns 
is about the applicability of the DPT to transitional democratic governments, the primary 
inquiry of this paper.  In this context, democratizing or transitional countries are defined 
as those in which a shift away from autocracy toward democracy has been made.3  These 
scholars have reservations about the applicability of the peace theory to such unstable 
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polities.  While they acknowledge that the promotion of mature democracies remains a 
desirable endeavor, their conclusions about peaceful behavior of states are less sanguine 
with respect to more turbulent situations where a state is transitioning from one form of 
governance to another.  Upon inspection of several cases, they demonstrate that nations 
are far more war-prone as they progress to democracy than either before or after the 
transition.4  In order to maximize the possibility of a successful transition to democracy 
and peace, these theorists support a particularly cautious approach to democratization that 
does not encourage nationalism to be used as a political tool.  Instead, certain instituted 
pre-conditions, such as providing elites with incentives for the future, favor the peaceful 
establishment of democracy. 
Of the factions opposing the DPT, some claim democracy plays little or no role in 
the maintenance and establishment of peace, but that economic interdependence accounts 
for nations not going to war with one another.  The fact that democratic countries happen 
to have strong economic ties explains why they do not go to war with one another.  The 
proponents of the economic interdependence argument have faced even more criticism 
than the advocates of the DPT, and the arguments they are confronted are cogent.  
Clearly one of the main problems faced by all peace theorists is causal ambiguity: it is 
difficult to determine which factors influence the maintenance of a peaceful state, and to 
what extent each factor contributes to the outcome.  In fact, studies have demonstrated 
that the stability of political regimes has a definite affect on economic development and 
that democracies in impoverished countries are “extremely fragile … while in wealthy 
countries they are impregnable”.5  Conversely, many supporters of the democratic peace 
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theory consider economic interdependence a necessary and inevitable consequence of 
established democracy.   
Reflecting the academic debate, the numerous countries and international 
organizations that seek to promote global peace often disagree on how to best achieve 
and maintain peace.  Most trust that the proliferation of democracy prevents the outbreak 
of war.  But the intellectual battle for political control is heavily contested and has 
immediate relevance for foreign policy.  As protracted conflicts such as the United 
States’ invasion of Iraq demonstrate, exporting democracy is far more difficult in practice 
than in theory.  Questions regarding how well prepared a society is to democratize 
become immediately relevant.  There are numerous repercussions of accepting either the 
democratic peace theory or the economic interdependence theory exclusively as valid 
premises.  Deciding to construct policy based exclusively on a single theory can cause 
radically divergent results.  The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that a policy 
derived from both theories might hold the best potential.  
Accepting the Democratic Peace Theory exclusively would immediately lead one 
to recommend the pursuit of democratizing policies.  This type of DPT based policy 
would see promoting the expansion of democracy across the globe as its primary aim.  In 
its more aggressive forms, this type of policy might lead to outright invasions, such as the 
recent Iraqi and Afghan wars.  More subtle forms of democratizing policies might be 
those which impose sanctions or less preferential diplomatic arrangements on countries 
that are not democratic in an effort to encourage the leadership and population of these 
countries to change their regime.  Studies have been conducted on the use of economic 
sanctions to promote democratic peace, indicating that a wide variety of policy 
 6
approaches can be adopted to promote the spread of democracy.  Without exploring all of 
the myriad policy options, one can certainly see that many are available.  An aggressive 
policy fueled exclusively by the democratic peace theory would consider economic 
interdependence as a secondary concern that will follow naturally once democracy has 
been installed. 
Advocating exclusively for more economic interdependence would lead to 
another set of policy prescriptions.  Proponents of foreign policy based solely on the 
promotion of economic interdependence assert that the best policies are those that 
promote globalism and interconnectedness.  This sort of argument does not rely on the 
need for democracy at all.  Some might argue, for example, that the United States trading 
relationships with China have directly contributed to the peace between the nations, in 
spite of the fact that China is a semi-authoritarian regime.  Other examples of this type of 
policy certainly exist, and theorists who firmly believe that economic interdependence, 
and not democracy, prevents war will hasten to adopt policies that promote trade 
agreements and market liberalization. 
 Another alternative combines aspects of both the DPT and the economic 
interdependence arguments.  When applied to transitional governments, the model 
encourages a regime change that accompanies increased economic interdependence.  In 
this vision, promoting economic interdependence is valuable only insofar as it empowers 
large majorities of the population, thus serving as a democratizing force.  Though many 
of the same basic initiatives for establishing democratic practices, such as steadily 
decreasing the previous governmental elites’ influence, might be supported, theorists 
advocating a combination of the DPT and economic interdependence en route to peace 
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would urge to proceed with a greater degree of caution.  One of their primary points is 
that precautions must be taken to avert the traditional sources of wars between 
democratic states or within states.  Promoting genuine pluralism becomes a main 
objective of the process in order to ensure that no groups are disenfranchised or have an 
incentive to pursue hostile action.   
As such, increasing economic interdependence between democratizing nations 
may become a valuable technique to encourage peaceful democratization.  In essence, 
economic interdependence serves as a check on the many possible sources of increased 
conflict during the transitional period.  While context specific mechanisms exist which 
promote interdependence during transition, they vary by case.  The interactive effect 
between democratization and interdependence has not been exhaustively studied to date, 
and might serve as an important way in which to reconcile some of the various factions 
within the democratic peace theory.  In other words, this approach seeks to determine 
how well economic interdependence checks the belligerent tendencies of transitional 
democracies.  Adopting a hybrid of the two peace theories is also appealing for it may be 
adapted to the specific historical and geo-political context of an emerging democracy.  In 
this sense economic interdependence serves as a precondition for peaceful 
democratization. 
 The choice of a context appropriate theory has the potential for a great impact on 
the successful promotion of worldwide peace.  Though it is difficult to ascertain whether 
economic interdependence is a factor that “overrides the relative bellicosity of 
democratizing states”6 universally, one can certainly consider their applicability on a case 
by case basis.  This paper seeks to explore the theoretical basis for both economic 
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interdependence and the democratic peace, and then apply them to some real world 
examples in order to determine their relevance in those instances.  As discussed in the 
paper, careful attention is dedicated to selecting recent and relevant cases.  The 
conflicting or interdependent pairs used in this study are Armenia and Azerbaijan, and 
Brazil and Argentina.  In one case, interdependence helped to prevent the outbreak of 
war, while in the other an insufficient relationship did nothing to prevent a protracted 
conflict. 
The structure of the paper will be split into two primary sections; a review of the 
theories and an exploration of the cases.  First, the paper will provide a summary of the 
democratic peace theory.  The paper will endeavor to demonstrate the existence and 
validity of the theory while simultaneously showing that it remains contested by some 
scholars.  The next section will briefly define the economic interdependence argument, 
which finds its roots in Kant’s contention that the “spirit of commerce … cannot exist 
side by side with war”7.  The aspects of the theory which seem to be a directly related to 
the democratic peace theory will also be highlighted, emphasizing the similarities 
between the two theories and providing a tentative guide as to how the two might be 
combined.  The indisputable connection between both theories and Immanuel Kant will 
also be outlined.  A further succinct literature review will focus on the transitional 
democracies and the theory of the state.  These sections will provide a succinct history 
and explanation of the origins of the theory. 
  Following the definition of the terms, a description of the primary areas of 
interest, and a review of the literature on both topics, the paper will advance a theoretical 
section exploring the complications of various qualitative differences in the conception of 
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both interdependence and conflict.  A brief overview of the methodologies and existing 
attempts to study interdependence follows, with the conclusion that case study method is 
an appropriate and yet underutilized means of studying interdependence.  The essential 
claim of the paper is that economic interdependence can decrease the likelihood for 
conflict in transitional democracies, will be presented, leaving policy recommendations 
for the last section of the paper. 
 A section with case studies will follow, attempting to apply the new theoretical 
framework to real cases.  Of the country pairs selected, each one will be classified and 
defended as a transitional democracy.  Thereafter the economic conditions in the dyad 
will be considered, with potential results explored.  The exact reasons for conflict will be 
emphasized, with particular attention to the restraining effects interdependence may 
appear to have had.  Finally, the necessary stabilizing policy prescriptions that will 
theoretically promote peaceful transitions to democracy encouraged by interdependence 
will be stated.  Broadly, the first section of the paper focuses on a theoretical foundation 
and background for both democratic peace and interdependence, while the second part 
applies these theories to cases. 
The paper’s conclusion will state the extent to which economic interdependence is 
relevant in transitional democracies.  The findings of the case studies will be revisited as 
evidence.  The last section of the paper will also focus on the policies that encourage 
economic interdependence and which should be instituted before the transition is made.  
Though not written explicitly from the United States perspective, the paper will also 
remark at this stage what institutions have the best capacity for promoting the prescribed 
changes. 
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A Brief History of the Primary Theories: 
 
Both the democratic peace theory and the argument that interdependence 
decreases conflict were originally pioneered by Immanuel Kant.  A philosopher and great 
thinker of his time, Kant sought to provide a theory that might limit armed conflict.  
Though the arguments he advanced have been modified significantly throughout time, the 
basic underlying concepts have not been altered.  While the primary purpose of this paper 
is to explore the relationship between economic interdependence in democratizing 
nations and the maintenance of a peaceful state, one can not adequately characterize the 
situation without a brief reference to Kant and the current primary theoretical camps on 
these issues. 
Most theorists trace the origins of the economic interdependence argument to the 
writings of Kant.  His influential writings on economics posited an indisputable link 
between the “commercial spirit” and “debasing self interest, cowardice and effeminacy”.8  
While phrased in a negative manner in such a context, the underlying logic of his 
argument was that increased commercial interactions between countries could drive them 
away from war.  In fact, in Perpetual Peace, Kant claimed that the very same commercial 
spirit was utterly “incompatible with war”.9  A necessary condition for such 
interdependence to prevent war was to allow for society to influence the political process 
in some capacity.  Thus, the second criteria for peace could be attained by developing 
republican constitutions. 
The argument advanced by Kant was more complex than merely encouraging 
commercial interaction to prevent wars.  In fact, he believed that a combination of 
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democratization, “cosmopolitan law” designed to allow free trade, and international 
organizations would bring about the aforesaid perpetual peace.10  These revolutionary 
and far-sighted claims have been heavily contested, particularly in recent years, serving 
as a testament to their continuing utility and potential validity.  While many different 
aspects of Kant’s argument have been criticized, the Democratic Peace Theory has 
emerged as a well supported theory asserting that democracies are less likely to go to war 
with one another.  Furthermore, research has indicated that “the pacific benefits of both 
democracy and economic interdependence are evident and substantial” and “neither 
variable eliminates the importance of the other”.11
The underlying structure of Kant’s argument has become the foundation of the 
liberal view regarding these issues.  The fundamental principles of the liberal beliefs held 
that increased transnational ties would be lawful, moral and supported by material 
incentives.12  At the crux of the liberal theory lies the belief that groups within the state 
influence the state’s actions leading to a reduction in interstate conflict.13  This ‘liberal’ 
view stems from the Kantian theory of peace which holds that increasingly democratic 
societies will be less likely to go to war because the empowered groups in society are the 
ones that are immediately adversely affected by such a conflict.14  Specifically, interest 
groups within society are characterized as having significant power to alter the political 
process, particularly in a democracy.  In a society governed by accountable elected 
officials, the interests of all significant groups can not be discounted, according to the 
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liberals.  The union of democracy and economic interdependence is encouraged by 
liberals as a promising route to reliably establishing peace. 
Realists, on the other hand, hold that states act rationally and in their own 
interests.  Their conception of international relations is radically different from the views 
held by liberals.  They view states as the fundamental units of an anarchic international 
system of politics.  As such, each state is engaged in a constant struggle to advance, and 
military might serves as the most important indicator of power.   Economic strategies are 
only of secondary importance to realists.15  For realists, matters of vulnerability and 
relative gain are the most relevant aspects of interdependence, as they underscore the 
inherent tension between states as primary actors.16  Despite acknowledging a possible 
relationship between interdependence and peace, the realists dismiss it as minimally 
important.  A third camp has emerged that denies any theoretical correlation between 
conflict and economic interdependence. 
The link between economic interdependence and peace is produced by the 
convergence of several group and national interests.  Generally, the vested interests of 
private sector groups which see potential profitability in tighter relations with another 
country fosters political pressure, which leads to a strengthening of the bond between 
countries rather than antagonistic behavior.  The incentives companies see in 
interdependence include larger markets for their product, cheaper transportation costs and 
less redundancy for larger multinational companies.  Foreign controlled international 
business interests may also indirectly contribute to this consensus by investing 
increasingly more as regional markets liberalize.  Government interests also play a role in 
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strengthening the connection between interdependence and peace.  In some instances, 
governments will wish to promote peace with interdependent nations to guarantee 
regional stability.  A desire for international legitimacy may also motivate countries to 
remain at peace with their closest trading partners to try and attract increased relations 
with the world’s most developed countries.   
As demonstrated, a multitude of contradictory theories exist regarding the affect 
both economic interdependence and democratization have on promoting peace.  The 
purpose of this paper is to delve into case studies in one well defined subcategory of 
examples to illustrate the viability of each of the theories.  The following case studies do 
not represent an attempt to prove or disprove either the liberal or realist viewpoints 
completely, but serve as an extension of their logic into the arena of economically 
interdependent transitional democracies.  Both the macro political arrangements between 
countries as well as any available information on sub- or supra- national actors will be 
carefully scrutinized as they may offer insights into the actual mechanisms which 
promote peace.  While some trends may be highlighted, they will apply primarily to the 
enumerated context, and most specifically only to the cases studied. 
Most of the existing literature focuses broadly on the themes of interdependence 
or democracy, with little attention to specific cases.  In the following pages a brief 
explanation of the terms transitional democracy, interdependence, and conflict will be 
made.  Thereafter a brief exploration of the existing literature and methodologies will be 
presented.  An explanation of the case selection criteria will follow.  The subsequent 
sections of the paper will focus on each case in detail, with any emerging relationships 
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advanced in the conclusion.  The exploration of a larger statistical trend using data sets 
will be left to further research. 
 
How to measure interdependence?   
 
There are many ways in which economic interdependence may be defined and 
quantified.  Although many scholars have written about interdependence, the definition 
continues to evolve and has multiple parts.  Most of the existing literature focuses on the 
ratio between trade and gross domestic product (GDP).  While this provides crisp and 
precise numbers for use in large data sets, it does not accurately convey the nuanced 
forms which interdependence may assume.  As this paper seeks to explore the potential 
existence of a correlation between interdependent democratizing nations and peaceful 
conduct at the case study level, the trade to GDP ratio will be only one of many 
considerations examined. 
In fact, Baldwin argues that the ratio of trade to GNP is only one aspect of 
interdependence which is more appropriately named “openness”17 as it corresponds to a 
state’s relationship to the outer world.  The general conception of interdependence can be 
divided into two categories; sensitivity interdependence and vulnerability 
interdependence. 18  The first of these deals with cases in which economic conditions in 
countries are largely sensitive to changes in other countries.  For example if a 
destabilizing monetary policy shift in one country adversely impacts another country, the 
two would be said to be sensitivity interdependent. 
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The second type of interdependence is the more common conception amongst 
international relations theorists.19  In this view, countries are irreparably harmed by 
dissolving their relationships with one another.  Thus, vulnerability interdependence 
highlights the gains of cooperation and the potential losses of destabilizing relationships.  
Although some might argue that the two definitions are correlated, they are clearly 
distinct.  Countries could have a high degree of sensitivity interdependence with 
intertwined economic factors, yet still be able to claim vulnerability independence.  This 
would imply that, despite being currently heavily reliant on one country, a cessation of 
trade relations could be offset by finding other trading partners abroad or adjusting 
domestic economic priorities. 
While the definition of sensitivity interdependence implies that interdependence 
itself weakens the stance of a country by making it subject to external disturbances, the 
vulnerability definition clearly demonstrates how interdependence strengthens countries.  
While the following cases have been examined in an effort to uncover all forms of 
interdependence that are present, the most likely type that will prevent transitional 
democracies from going to war is vulnerability interdependence, where nations can only 
lose by abrogating relations with another country.  Sensitivity interdependence, on the 
other hand, might be heavily criticized by nationalists in a young democracy as ceding 
too much power to policy generators abroad, whereas vulnerability interdependence 
could be seen as a necessary bond serving to strengthen two countries. 
As stated above, efforts to quantify interdependence have relied predominately on 
the ratio of trade balance, or the sum of imports and exports, to gross national product.  
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This is again considered a measure of “openness”.20  Some critics of this type of 
measurement have asserted that asymmetric trade arrangements may lead a smaller and 
weaker country to be more heavily reliant on the more economically powerful country, 
restraining only one of the two from pursuing armed conflict.21  Furthermore, the absence 
of considerations beyond trade, such as financial markets, stocks, and flows of capital are 
rarely examined.  Additionally, the actual design of the state directly influences the extent 
to which interdependence exists, with governments that are institutionally restrained from 
influencing the markets becoming more aware of the direct consequences of international 
intervention.22  These sorts of restrictions on market interference are commonly found in 
advanced and stable democracies, but may not be present in democratizing nations.  
Several factors beyond the trade balance influence the extent to which countries are 
interdependent. 
Unfortunately, most studies are too heavily reliant on trade data as it remains one 
of the most readily available sources of information.  Throughout the course of this paper, 
efforts will be made to incorporate any available information regarding interdependence.  
This naturally includes macro trade data and trends between the two countries and 
governmental policies.  Furthermore, the primary civilian or business interests will also 
be explored to discern how their motives contributed or detracted from heightened 
interdependence.  Again, the decision to study the potential impact of interdependence on 
transitional democracies through case studies instead of large samples was deliberate, and 
allows for a slightly more expansive exploration of interdependence than much of the 
traditional literature.  
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How to measure Conflict? 
 
The conceptualization and definition of conflict is essential for a thorough 
examination of the topic of peace in international relations.  The definition of conflict 
must extend to transitional democracies, and should not be conflated with internal 
struggles in such cases.  While some countries may be at odds with each other, their 
behavior may not qualify as conflict.  Economic and diplomatic competitions are better 
characterized as contests than conflicts, though they can often escalate into conflicts.  
Many definitions of conflict exist in the literature. 
One method employed by Rasler and Thompson is to measure the preponderance 
of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) and wars.  While wars clearly fit the description 
of conflict, the various definitions of MIDs are somewhat ambiguous.  They may be 
considered activities which involve the “threat, display or use of military force short of 
war” by one state “explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, 
official forces, property, or territory of another state”.23  These activities may range from 
“alerts” to “clashes” or simply “blockades”.24  However, there are some limitations to 
relying only on data sets that focus on MIDs as the causes of conflict are distilled into 
discrete events without exploring the series of events leading to conflict.25   
Others have conceived of militarized disputes as necessarily “explicit, overt, non-
accidental and government approved”.26  Interestingly, however, some theories indicate 
that democracies may use low level amounts of violence to signal their intentions to an 
opponent.  Near universal consensus exists, however, that democracies are very unlikely 
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to step beyond the bounds of limited military threats and diplomatic action against each 
other.27  Again, the key addition of a requirement that conflicts be explicitly intentional 
qualifies militarized disputes.  With conflict defined in this manner, it also enhances the 
likelihood that democracies will avoid this type of behavior. 
Naturally the intensity of conflict forms a continuum of potential definitions.  
Lower-intensity conflicts include trade disagreements, sanctions and threats whereas 
higher intensity conflict includes the use of force and outright war.28  While large 
statistical studies have a clear requirement for a very precise definition of conflict in 
order to run regressions, case studies need only highlight the numerous definitions of 
conflict and note the presence of any conflict whatsoever in the cases.  Regressions 
require conflicts to be defined as existing or not, sometimes oversimplifying the extent to 
which conflict may be present.  One of the purposes of this paper is to better 
conceptualize the relevant definition of conflict for interdependent transitional 
democracies. 
 Conflicts are not, however, synonymous with contests.  Interdependence has an 
impact on both contests and conflicts, but only conflicts and contests with a likelihood of 
escalating into armed conflict are of immediate relevance to preventative peace theorists.  
Conflicts are existing wars, whose settlements may be influenced according to the degree 
of interdependence between any two countries.  While this relationship is significant, it 
remains beyond the scope of the claim that interdependence reduces states probability of 
going to war when a conflict is already in progress.  This is better indicated through 
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contests which, if not properly managed, could lead to a conflict.29  As such, the primary 
interest of this paper is to examine the impact of interdependence on contests, observing 
under which conditions they escalate to conflicts, as described above. 
 
Transitional Democracy & Theory of the State 
 
 A coherent theory of the state as well as a clear definition of transitional 
democracy is necessary for any discussion of the effects of interdependence on peace in 
transitional democracies.  Many authors have commented on the manner in which the 
traditional paradigm of territorial balance of power politics has been influenced by the 
rise of globalization.  Flows in means of production such as “capital, labor and 
information”30 better approximate an international equilibrium of power than political 
alliances.  Consequently, the “instruments to combat or dissuade … conflicts are far more 
numerous and powerful than in the past”.31  As the “return on information”32 has come to 
exceed the return on land, countries find themselves in an increasingly restrictive 
international system, wherein might is exercised by attracting economic development, 
rather than through wars of conquest.  Contemporary state behavior has fundamentally 
changed and now relies on factors other then the traditional ones (military, state 
diplomacy) to carry out policy. 
Liberals and realists characterize politicians, who both parties  consider standard 
vehicles for economic and foreign policy generation in democracies, using distinct and 
different theories of state.  Some examples of theories of state include the median voter, 
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pluralist and autonomous state.  The first two can be deemed liberal theories as they 
allow for groups within society to direct policy through either the median voters opinion, 
or through and amalgamation of groups interests, respectively.33  The autonomous state, 
on the other hand, is one in which the countries goals are “distinct from the immediate 
demands of the society over which it rules”.34  Generally speaking, transitional 
democracies should be either a median voter or a pluralist state as they afford 
opportunities for the citizens to be increasingly politically empowered. 
Gelpi and Grieco argue that democracy provides a much better environment for 
economic interdependence and thereby fosters a peaceful state.  Their conclusions rely on 
several assumptions concerning the composition of the state, for example, that politicians 
respond to, and reflect the interests of various groups within the society. Furthermore, the 
model assumes that elected officials have a vested interest in maintaining power, and are 
consequently “more concerned … about the prospective effects of the breakdown of 
foreign trade as a result of a militarized dispute.35  Their statistical results corroborate 
these findings; strongly linking the affect interdependence has on reducing the potential 
for war, particularly between two democracies.   
Their models do not, however, describe the impact interdependence has on 
nations during the democratization process.  In fact, as discussed above, emerging 
democracies tend to be more war prone than democracies.  This tendency might 
counteract the pacifying attributes of interdependence.  Furthermore, this generally 
turbulent transition period could alter the underlying realist/liberal schism.  Transitional 
democracies may be more reliant on liberal principles as they are inherently less stable, 
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impeding the transmission of the people’s will to elected officials.  While democratizing 
states are certainly sensitive to the mechanisms of popular demand, transitional 
democracies are often characterized by a political stalemate engendered by the 
enfranchisement of new groups, a lack of authority, and heavy competition for popular 
support during a short period of time.36  Accordingly, democratizing states may be 
considered super responsive to the mechanisms of popular demand although not 
necessarily through the emerging democratic institutions.  In fact, the theory of state most 
applicable to democratizing countries is a pluralist one in which several groups are 
contending for control of the government and all have some influence on foreign policy. 
 A transitional democracy is one in which the complete shift from autocracy to 
democracy is not complete.  Generally, autocracy is a form of state government in which 
the source of authority is perpetually vested in one person.  Autocrats depend on various 
groups to secure their power, often using the military.  Democracy, in contrast, is a state 
in which “authorities are accountable to the bulk of the population… through fair, regular 
and competitive elections”.37  In the case where democratization has not been completely 
achieved, institutions are undermined and power becomes limited.  In these instances of 
“institutional deformation”,38 the risk of international conflict is increased.  Nationalism 
dominates the domestic agenda, and preparation for war may become the central purpose 
of the state.  Often elites invoke nationalist ideals as a final effort to consolidate their 
waning power.  The ultimate result of the turbulence caused by democratization is an 
increased propensity to wage war abroad. 
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 Several institutional changes help to ease the transition to democracy.  Internally, 
institutions that democracy requires must be present before mass political participation 
becomes viable.39  These have been characterized as preconditions of democracy and 
include: empowering the old elites, creating a “marketplace of ideas”, and fostering 
incentives in the international environment.40 The more of these preconditions that are 
present the better prepared a nation is to become democratic, and the quicker and more 
permanently it will do so.  This simple concept seems to have escaped some 
democratization enthusiasts who continue to focus on the advanced products of 
democratic systems, such as complete freedom of speech, rather than the foundations of 
democracy.41  Bearing in mind that countries attain democracy in spite of varying 
historical and domestic situations, other external stabilizing forces could contribute to 
peaceful transition to democracy as well. 
 A thorough consideration of the impact economic interdependence bears on a 
transitional democracy’s likelihood to go to war must therefore evaluate the extent to 
which democratization has been attained in each of the countries being examined in the 
case studies.  The aforementioned political elites have little incentive to encourage liberal 
trade, and often rely on providing economic favors to their allies.42  As such, the 
prospects of increased international trade are substantially reduced in transitional 
democracies.  Thus, economic interdependence, even if only for the benefit of the elite, 
must be present prior to a democratizing step in order for it to serve as a disincentive for 
international conflict.  In theory the economic relationship between two democratizing 
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states prior to a conflict should reveal little economic interdependence, as it would be 
counterintuitive for elite or empowered individuals to use nationalism against their own 
economic interests.   In fact, economic interdependence might be one of many requisite 
steps external powers should encourage to assure a peaceful transition to democracy. 
 
Overview of the Existing Literature and Case Study 
Approach 
 
Although much research has been conducted both on economic interdependence 
and on conflict very few attempts have been made to better characterize the relationship 
between the two within specific contexts.  While most endeavors have demonstrated a 
correlation between peace and interdependence, they have not sought to explore the 
mechanisms through which interdependence fosters peace.  In fact, some projects have 
actually demonstrated how interdependence can lead to an increased probability of 
conflict.  There is near universal consensus, however, that interdependence and peace are 
correlated in some manner.43
A host of methodological differences have led to divergent theories as to how and 
why these factors are related.  Most of these studies focus on large sets of quantitative 
data, running regressions to capture and demonstrate the relationship between 
interdependence and conflict.  Although these studies have been significant and yielded 
many interesting results, they have failed to adequately account for the actual nature of 
the interaction between interdependence and conflict.44  While large scale studies prove 
the existence of a relationship beyond statistical doubt, they do not specify how or why 
                                                 
43 See Barberei in Mansfield & Pollins, Russet & O’Neal 
44 Mansfield & Pollins, p 5 
 24
the relationship operates.  A different approach might include a qualitative deconstruction 
of cases which might reveal such causal mechanisms. 
A temporal and spatial bias is also evident in the current literature on 
interdependence that does not rely as heavily on statistical analysis.45  In other words, 
these studies of interdependence have shortcomings in their sample selection.  Mansfield 
and Pollins assert that the focus on World War I and II powers in much of the literature 
prevents a serious examination of smaller and more economically vulnerable countries.  
The primary players in the world wars were developed, industrialized and potentially self 
sufficient, therefore economic interdependence may have a lesser impact on their 
diplomatic interactions than is the case in emerging democracies.  Furthermore, the 
tendency to conduct research based primarily on twentieth century cases may belie any 
temporal trends in the relationship between interdependence and peace.  While Mansfield 
and Pollins acknowledge that more data is available for recent cases, they still argue that 
fundamental differences in other author’s arguments may emerge if their theses are 
applied across time. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine a very specific and well defined area 
within the broader context of economic interdependence, and outside of the realm of 
twentieth century industrial powers.  The causal mechanisms will be explored through 
two case studies that may elucidate some of the universal properties of the 
interdependence-peace relationship.  As the focus of the paper is transitional 
democracies, the problem of a sampling bias due to examining only global powers is 
restricted.  Transitional democracies are more often less developed and economically 
independent than other countries.  Though the temporal selection of cases may still favor 
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relatively recent cases, the exploration of earlier cases is left to further study.  
Complicating factors such as mercantilism and colonialism during the advent of 
democracy would overly obscure the analysis. 
The decision to explore the transitional democracy case via idiothetic rather than 
nomothetic means was a conscious one.  The discussion will utilize both quantitative and 
qualitative methods, as described above, to demonstrate the relationship between peace 
and interdependence.  The case study approach has methodological benefits, although 
any conclusions may have limited applicability.  While a preliminary regression on 
numerous specially coded transitional cases could be conducted to determine whether a 
relationship between interdependence and peace exists, it would not explain the 
functionality of such a relationship.  The case study approach uses the specific instances 
to explain the actual mechanisms of the interaction.  Although the conclusions therefore 
apply predominantly to the cases selected, the emergence of a trend would certainly 
warrant further study amongst different cases. 
Ripsman and Blanchard presented the primary difficulties associated with 
qualitative research on interdependence in a joint paper.  The recommendations they 
established are significant, and helped guide the selection of cases within this paper.  
Ripsman and Blanchard demonstrate the variety of methods used in qualitative analysis.  
For example, while some studies concentrate on interdependence as a dependent variable, 
others use it as an independent variable.46  Lastly, they consider the actors that should be 
the primary focus of any study.  While they concede that all groups in society have the 
potential to influence the state, they conclude that policymakers are the most relevant.  
They deem key governmental actors to serve as “gatekeepers of society”, reflecting the 
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general will of the population.47  Business interests are marginalized as they are often 
contradictory.  An encompassing and compelling case study would explore all relevant 
groups where possible. 
Lastly, the decision to examine interdependence among transitional democracies 
at the dyadic level was made as it reflects the true double-sided nature of any political or 
economic arrangement.  These pairs of states, or dyads, have often been used in existing 
studies on the Democratic Peace.  Specifically, case studies based on one nation are 
difficult because they allow for a general study of the relationship with all other potential 
allies and not with any other specific type of government.48  Furthermore, the costs of 
war are best measured with respect to one specific partner rather than all allies.49  The 
study of interdependence at the level of the dyad as opposed to the state or international 
levels has been accepted as one of the most effective methods.  Using the established 
functional definitions of the relevant terms and effective methodologies, two dyads will 
be explored. 
 
Criteria for Case Study Selection: 
 
 The aforementioned definitions and summaries of existing literature and 
methodologies inform the selection of cases for this study.  In an effort to accurately and 
appropriately bound the study, cases must meet a certain set of criteria to be considered 
for study.  As mentioned above, the deliberate choice to focus on dyads narrows the 
potential set of case studies.  Furthermore, it is desirable that both of the countries 
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involved in the relationship are transitional democracies.  This seriously restricts the 
number of eligible dyads.  Several other prescriptions for case study selection have been 
incorporated into the final selection. 
Again, the ideal cases will feature two transitional democracies that have some 
existing relationship with each other.  Rather than consider countries which have had 
democracy externally imposed, cases were selected which featured organic transitions to 
democracy following the retreat of a superpower or due to other internal domestic 
developments absent large-scale intervention by other states.  While this limits the utility 
of the study for decisions by international peace promoting actors about when to 
intervene in a given situation, it serves to establish a first connection between 
interdependence and peace in the transitional case.  In review, the transitional 
democracies need not be entirely free societies, but merely ones in which there has been a 
shift from autocracy towards democracy. 
An ideal sample would include a case from both situations where either a conflict 
ensued or where no conflict ensued.  This allows for useful comparisons and contrast to 
be drawn, isolating the effects of economic interdependence.  The analysis will seek to 
determine if a correlation exists between the likelihood of maintaining a peaceful 
democratization and interdependence.  The selection involves choosing some cases with 
and some without the presence of conflict. Although choosing certain cases based on the 
eventual outbreak of a conflict does bias the sample to some degree, it is a necessary 
process for choosing a very limited number of case studies.  As such, a dyad with a 
conflict and a case without a war were selected. 
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In terms of temporal and special homogeneity, much of the literature has focused 
on cases predating the cold war, with an emphasis on the world wars.  Consequently, the 
studies have been inherently biased towards large and powerful countries, with little 
regard for smaller powers.  Particularly in the present era, where most conflicts involve 
localized conflict between smaller nations, the applicability of interdependence and 
democracy in fully developed and powerful nations has lost its prescriptive potency.  In 
an effort to determine the effects of interdependence on more contemporary transitional 
democracies, cases were selected from within the last thirty years.  This also averts the 
potential problem of distortion presented by the cold war. 
The paper addresses vulnerability and sensitivity interdependence in two 
democratizing countries as equally significant, though these two may be difficult to 
isolate in practice.  In order to ensure the potential for a higher degree of 
interdependence, geographically contiguous or proximate countries were selected.  While 
not guaranteed, geographic proximity should provide for some relationship and potential 
for gaining or losing from established economic relationships.  Russet and O’Neal note 
that “neighbors are likely to have the most reasons to fight--over territorial boundaries, 
natural resources, the grievances of cross-border ethnic groups”50.  Thus, instances 
wherein conflict between neighbors is limited gain even more significant.  Also, the cases 
were selected with attention to finding two countries of similar economic developmental 
stages, avoiding any substantial discussion of the superpowers.  In fact, conflict between 
asymmetric economic powers may be more likely for reasons beyond interdependence.51  
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The criteria were thus narrowed to physically close, developmentally similar, and 
democratically transitional dyads. 
The best set of potential candidate cases were enumerated in William Thompson’s 
set of “enduring rivals”, which is composed of countries that have had consistent 
relations with one another.  The tension between the countries has often resulted in the 
outbreak of war or other forms of conflict, and makes this set particularly interesting.  
Applying the enumerated criteria to these cases, two were selected based on their 
temporal homogeneity and special heterogeneity.  Thompson defines strategic rivals as 
dyads in which the countries are competitors, mutual military threats, or enemies.52  He 
notes that weaker states are capable of competing primarily with proximate states, 
reinforcing the decision to focus on geographically adjacent countries.  
While the numerous criteria he establishes for defining rivals are thorough, the 
main point of interest is the usefulness of rivals to examine interdependence in weaker 
democratizing nations.  Using Thompson’s set of dyads as a source for cases guarantees 
tension between countries, without guaranteeing conflict.  Thus, various rivalries may be 
examined to isolate the effects of interdependence on the peace or conflict between 
countries.  Cases were selected based on the given criteria from the list of rivals 
Thompson identifies.53  Two cases were selected; Armenia and Azerbaijan, and 
Argentina and Brazil, both from the 1980s and 90s. 
The first case was that of the relatively recent conflict and relationship between 
Azerbaijan and Armenia.  A short war was waged between the two countries in the early 
1990s.  Both of the countries were democratizing at the time, as will be discussed later.  
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An effort will be made to discover any significant economic interdependence between the 
two, though the foregoing analysis predicts that there will be little to none.  The second of 
the cases is the rivalry between Argentina and Brazil.  Both of these countries underwent 
waves of democratization in the later half of the twentieth century.  While the tension 
here occurred during the cold war, these effects can be ignored as both countries were in 
the same camp.  This case is particularly interesting because of its lack of conflict which 
predicts a higher degree of interdependence. The cases provide a geographically diverse 
sample to explore initial considerations regarding democratization, interdependence and 
peace. 
The two cases were selected as some of the best examples from Thompson’s 
extensive list of rival countries.  First, the sample of potential cases was restricted to 
strategic rivals, a subcategory which Thompson defines as “two states engaged in 
competition with the expectation of future conflict”.54  Of these, many could be 
eliminated due to their antiquity, as primarily contemporary cases were considered.  For 
example, a rivalry between Britain and Burma during the early nineteenth century bore 
little resemblance to more recent events.  In fact, the candidate cases were restricted to 
rivalries that extended beyond 1980.  Of the remaining cases, many were subject to 
distortion from great power intervention, such as the relationship between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, which had undeniable undercurrents of Soviet-American tension.
 Furthermore, cases which concerned two countries that were not democratizing 
were also eliminated.  Thus, while the rivalry between Kenya and Sudan between 1989 
and 1994 had an acceptable context and lack of significant external influence, it was 
waged between authoritarian regimes which were far from democratic.  The most 
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promising candidates were those which demonstrated a high degree of democratization 
and limited direct external intervention on behalf of either country.  Aside from the two 
cases selected, both the Croatia-Serbia rivalry of the 1990s and the tensions between 
South Africa and Zimbabwe during the 1980s were promising.  The Serb-Croat case was 
not explored as it mirrored the Armenian-Azeri conflict too closely, but could be the 
subject of further research.  South Africa and Zimbabwe posed another interesting case 
where tension was evident and both experienced movement towards democratization.  
The developmental disparity between the countries, however, set this case apart from the 
others.  Ultimately, The Argentina/Brazil and Armenia/Azerbaijan cases were selected 
for their contemporary status, lack of direct external interference, presence of 
democratization in both countries, and relative parity between the countries. 
As aforementioned, the expanded definition of conflict should allow a broad 
reading within these cases.  “States that interact often will engage in both cooperative and 
conflictual ways”.55  This underscores the logic of selecting nations which are considered 
to be rivals.  A thorough examination of countries that are constantly interacting will be 
much more fruitful than considering countries that have only sporadically interacted.  
Furthermore, in cases where conflict is present, one can attempt to isolate the changes 
that spurred the conflict as well as considering ex post changes that might have 
contributed to a peaceful resolution of the conflict.  In this instance, the presence or lack 
of economic interdependence will be of particular interest. 
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Case Studies: 
 
The basic format of the case studies will be as follows.  A brief introduction will 
characterize the relationship between the two countries, including any notable historical 
conflicts.  Thereafter, both countries democratizations will be explained.  Furthermore, 
the time period in which both countries democratized will be examined.  An exploration 
of the extent of interdependence will follow, highlighting all available information 
regarding the economic relationship between the two democratizing countries.  Lastly, 
the presence or lack of a significant conflict will be accounted for with reference to the 
available information on interdependence.   
 
Armenia and Azerbaijan- Imminent Conflict in the 
Absence of Interdependence 
 
 Armenia and Azerbaijan have an intertwined history, qualifying them as a clear 
example of a dyad characterized by rivalry.  In the 1920s, both countries were absorbed 
into the Soviet Union, and underwent much of their modern development under the 
direction of the central Soviet government.  Earlier, precedents for border conflict 
between the two nations had been set, and to some extent allowed the Soviets to enter the 
region in the name of stability.  A substantial amount of research has been dedicated to 
exploring the exact events of the ongoing conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, 
where the border still remains a dangerous region.  The precise details of this conflict are 
not as relevant as its origins.  The current military stalemate is due to a combination of 
historical precedent, rapid democratization, and antagonism fueled by competing claims 
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to the Nagarno-Karabakh region.  Another factor that contributed to the escalation of the 
conflict is the lack of economic interdependence. 
 
Historical Overview 
 
 Ethnic Armenian’s are descendents of ancient tribes that have inhabited the 
geographic region for hundreds of years.  The Armenians were Christianized during the 
reign of the Roman Empire.  Azeri history, though similar to that of Armenia, has some 
notable differences.  Invading Arab armies brought Islam to the region, widening a 
developing gap between the two areas.56  The contemporary Armenians have an acute 
sense of self-identity based largely on their linguistic history.57  Standing on a land bridge 
between two continents, the trans-Caucasian nations were routinely involved in power 
struggles between the major powers in the vicinity, most often Turkey, Russia and Iran.  
It is important to note that the Azeris had not developed a true national identity until “the 
late nineteenth century … as a result of growing communal tensions with the 
Armenians”.58  
 This tension was created by a particular dispute over a region within Azerbaijan 
that had an ethnic Armenian majority.  Both countries gained their independence amid 
chaotic conditions.  The Armenians were forced to accept a harsh settlement from the 
Turks in the Treaty of Batum, concluded on June 4, 1918.  The Azeris were equally hard 
pressed by their neighbors.  There was some limited history of collaboration during the 
time, including the short-lived Transcaucasian Federal Republic, which incorporated 
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Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan.  Armenia, however, subsequently seceded from this 
republic, and both countries were eventually captured by the Soviets in 1920 in the wake 
of islamic aggression in the Nagarno Kharabakh region.59
The brief invasion by the “Army of Islam” in the Nagarno-Kharabakh region 
exposed the Armenians to countless horrors and sparked the initial conflict.  Upon the 
withdrawal of the army, the Armenians and Azeris began fighting in an attempt to secure 
more land for their fledgling states.60  Although some negotiations were concluded, the 
emergence of the Soviet Russians in the area forced both nations into becoming amongst 
the first Soviet Socialist Republics in April and May of 1920.  In fact, the Soviet armies 
entered Nagarno Kharabakh in May of 1920.61  The Russian’s entered Transcaucasia 
again, and incorporated both Armenia and Azerbaijan into the Soviet Union as separate 
Socialist Republics.  The question of Naarno-Karabakh was left unsettled, as Stalin 
considered it part of Azerbaijan.  The ethnic tension generated by this decision was not 
addressed until the very last days of the Soviet Union. 
  
Democratization  
 
 As the Soviet Union began to weaken in the 1980s, independence movements 
evolved from all corners of the former superpower.  With institutional constraints 
gradually becoming more permissive, Armenians and Azeris were free to voice their 
opinions and make claims to Nagarno Kharabakh.  The liberalization of the Soviet Union 
demonstrates the first steps of democratization for the two transcaucasian republics. 
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 In Armenia, the Soviet abstained from voting on Gorbechev’s referendum 
on preserving the Soviet Union, electing to hold a separate vote and establish 
independence.  Armenia made this declaration of its intention to become independent on 
August 23, 1990, and achieved this goal on September 1991.62  Of the various groups 
competing for influence in the state, those representing a faction dedicated to 
independence and restoration of Kharabakh to the Armenian territory were dominant.  
The countries first president, Ter-Petrosyan had been a member of the “Kharabakh 
Committee” which had had two aims; democratization and the independence of 
Kharabakh.63
Ter Petrosyan had observed the Moscow Coup, which hardened his resolve to 
remove Armenia from the struggling Soviet Union as soon as possible.64  In September 
1991, an overwhelming 99% of the people of Armenia voted for independence.  Despite 
some initial resistance from Russia, which sent paratroopers into the country to prevent 
independence, Armenia did eventually succeed in attaining full independence.  The 
domestic political agenda in Armenia was dominated by concerns over Nagarno-
Kharabakh as Levon Ter-Petrosyan was inaugurated as Armenia’s president on 
November 11.65  Ter Petrosyan’s was able to pursue his “vision of Armenian 
independence and self-sufficiency”, a decision he would live to regret.66  The Armenians 
had achieved their independence and democratically elected their first president on an 
aggressive platform with the aim of stabilizing their territorial and economic conditions. 
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 Azeri independence followed a similar path, though it actually began earlier and 
only truly culminated with the election of the first non-communist president.  Azerbaijan 
declared sovereignty on September 23, 1989.  More than 99 percent of voters ratified a 
referendum on independence in 1991.  Unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan achieved 
independence through legal methods within the Soviet Union, which helped to petition 
for its immediate international recognition as a state.67  Their first election was won 
easily by an Azeri communist, Mutalibov, who ran unopposed on September 8, 1991.68  
A struggle between various ruling elites ensued, particularly between the Azerbaijani 
Communist Party and the Popular Front.   
The Azeris elected Abulfaz Elichibey, an anti communist, on June 7, 1992.  This 
represented the first multi-candidate election in the country.69  He emphasized the need 
for the development of a currency and a market economy, with a strong preference for 
bilateral trading arrangements.70  The Popular Front in Azerbaijan gained credibility for 
its tough and aggressive stance on the Nagarno Kharabakh issue.  Some claim that 
military shortcomings cost two of the subsequent presidents, including Elchibey, their 
office.71  The Azeris independence was achieved on a similar basis as Armenia’s, though 
they maintained a better relationship with the Russians. 
In the wake of these two independence movements, both countries opted to 
escalate the level of hostility in Kharabakh under intense domestic and nationalist 
pressure.  This warlike tendency justifies the belief that transitional democracies are war 
prone and that leaders in such countries often use foreign conflict to achieve consensus at 
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home.  Both countries were considered democratic to some extent when the conflict 
began, and continued to make more steps toward democratization though time.72  
Although the foundation for a conflict had been established in the nineteenth century, the 
true ethnic and cultural differences between Azeris and Armenians are not as significant 
as some assume.  Armenia, the economically weaker of the two parties, stood to lose 
more through the breaking of ties between the two countries, but both countries were 
already in dire economic condition.  Greater interdependence would have helped avoid 
protracted conflict and the resulting stalemate. 
Due to the complete lack of substantial interdependence, no domestic groups in 
either country had incentives to cooperate.  Azerbaijan was optimistic that the 
blossoming oil industry would satisfy its economic needs based on western demand.  The 
legacy of a 1988 earthquake coupled with unreliable power supply distorted the 
Armenian business and private interests, who saw the conflict with Azerbaijan as a top 
priority, rather than economic integration.  Considering the counterfactual case wherein 
Armenia and Azerbaijan could have been interdependent entering into their 
democratization processes, one can see that war would have been far less likely. 
Rather than having substantial and well supported independence movements 
actively engaged in war promoting rhetoric, the political bases of support would have 
been far different.  In fact, while the actual scenario that unfolded represented a near 
consensus of political will in both countries, this would not have been the case if private 
interests existed and had been significantly adverse to war.  The problems arising from 
the economic arrangement of the USSR are manifold.  Armenia and Azerbaijan would 
certainly have had closer regional ties if they had not acted as peripheral economies to the 
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Russian hub.  In that event, the two countries would have been better connected, with 
more infrastructure and free passage between them.  This would probably have promoted 
a more accurate awareness of each others populations and cultures, in turn blunting the 
aggressive rage which erupted after independence. 
Beyond the establishment of a social and cultural tolerance, the vested business 
interests of regional bi- or multinational countries would have been adamantly opposed to 
the escalation of conflict.  This assumes, of course, that these groups would be politically 
potent.  A cursory examination of other countries, however, underscores the conclusion 
that private interests are becoming increasingly more powerful and influential, 
particularly in democratic processes.  Thus, an interdependent Armenia and Azerbaijan 
would have checked the nationalist tendencies that came to dominate both countries 
domestic concerns by restoring an awareness of economic imperatives. 
 
The Nagarno-Kharabakh Conflict: Overdetermined 
 
 The conflict that ensued was overdetermined in several ways.  First, a historical 
precedent for conflict in the area remained present in the minds of the citizens of both 
countries.  Despite the long Soviet imposed cessation of hostilities, both populations were 
prepared to reinitiate their quests for the territory.  Second, the transition to democracy 
heightened the enthusiasm for war.  The leadership of dominant political coalitions in 
both countries sought to engage in the conflict as a basis for consolidating power.  The 
independence fervor and new democratic apparatus served to allow the population to 
convey their will to the government, conferring authority to the leadership.  Lastly, the 
stunning lack of interdependence between Armenia and Azerbaijan minimized the 
 39
foreseeable effects of conflict, encouraging both sides to proceed aggressively.  The 
chaos amidst the collapse of the Soviet Union did little to quell the enthusiasm for 
territorial gain.  Furthermore, existing tension between the countries caused by the 
Azerbaijani blockade of Armenia, exacerbated tensions to the point where rapprochement 
was unthinkable. 
The Karabakh conflict found its roots in ethnic fighting which preceded either of 
the countries true independence.  The reemergence of the historical conflict began on 
February 28, 1988 during ethnic rioting in the region.73  An Azeri blockade of Armenia 
began in response in the same month.74  Interestingly, this conflict began before the full 
democratization of both countries.  Despite the heavy toll in terms of casualties inflicted 
upon the Azeris, the real cost of the conflict in economic terms has been much more 
severe for the landlocked Armenians.   
 Again, the primary focus here is on the lack of interdependence, which could have 
acted as a restraint on bellicose tendencies.  The primary reason for the absence of 
developed economic ties between the two countries was the legacy of the Soviet centrally 
planned economy.  The Soviet economy was heavily regulated by the state planning 
commission (Gosplan), which oversaw the roles of regional economies.  Despite some 
attempts to modify or regionalize this system, the central economy remained the basis for 
economic activity within the Soviet Union.75  Furthermore, the failures of the central 
command economy were obscured by the standards of success the Soviet Union used.  
Rather than measuring performance based on goods sold, economic stability was 
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measured through production.  Using a ratio between inputs and outputs, Gorbachev 
could claim that the Soviets were twice as productive as the Western industrial nations.76   
The deceptive standards of economic success and weak state apparatus could 
survive only so long as the empire that sustained them.  With the steady crumbling and 
ultimate dissolution of the Soviet Union underway, nations such as Armenia and 
Azerbaijan were not able to continue producing, as the realities of the market economy 
became apparent.  The state driven and sponsored demand for goods was no longer 
present.  Additionally, none of the newly freed republics created by the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union had any “experience with foreign trade of credit transactions”77 as 
everything had previously been governed by the strong Soviet system.  Countries enjoyed 
full or nearly full monopolies for the production of specific products.78  The Soviet 
prototype has endeavored to create massive gains from economies of scale, which would 
allow countries to focus on certain industries.  This fostered much “republican 
specialization”, which worked tolerably well during the Soviet era, but left countries with 
dangerously lopsided economies thereafter79.  Mikhail Gorbachev recognized that the 
republics of the Soviet Union were very inter-dependent and that “dire consequences 
would follow from geo-economic fragmentation”.80    
Trade flows remained primarily within the Soviet Union.  The USSR had 
established a good system of transport and distribution.  Moscow had a commitment to 
redistributing resources from more affluent regions to other regions.81  Interestingly, 
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some of the Soviet republics were benefited from the system, as some goods were 
overvalued and others undervalued.  One of the top four budgetary donors was 
Azerbaijan.82  This underscores the importance of the economic disparity between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan.  The so-called “contract of the century” between Azerbaijan 
and the International Oil consortium promised some stability for the floundering Azeri 
economy.83  Though both countries were somewhat over zealous about independence 
from the Soviet Union, not fully grasping the aftermath of breaking their relationships, 
Azerbaijan actually stood a conceivable chance of gaining from leaving the union. 
Both economies were devastated by the downfall of the Soviet Union, distorting 
the extent to which they could harm one another in the Karabakh conflict.  With both 
economies reeling in the wake of a Soviet withdrawal, the countries were left 
economically independent from one another allowing political and security prerogatives 
to take precedence over other economic initiatives.  The leadership that came to power 
was consequently strongly nationalistic and war prone.  The direct effect of independence 
was to empower a “militant nationalism”.84   Groups within both Armenia and 
Azerbaijan were able to increase support for the war effort by employing nationalistic 
messages.85  The emergence of intelligentsia and media independent from the Soviet 
Union allowed these countries to articulate their individual histories, strengthening unity 
and encouraging conflict.  In the wake of the Soviet collapse, the Armenian and Azeri 
elites were prepared to wage a war that was fueled by immature nationalism.  The 
complete collapse of the Soviet system had removed all structural impediments to war, 
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and a lack of true interdependence did not provide alternatives to conflict.  Furthermore, 
factors which could inhibit war, such as political pressure from private groups, were also 
absent. 
A complete characterization of both economies at the time of democratization is 
difficult due to the lack of good documentation during the chaotic transition to 
democracy and immediate conflict, though general production trends existed in both 
countries.86  The Azeri economy of the time was heavily reliant on oil, gas, cotton and 
other agricultural products, while Armenia’s post soviet economy was known for its 
production of machinery and fruit.87  Azerbaijan seems to have weathered the transition 
to independence somewhat better due to its wealth in oil, a resource coveted by the West.  
Armenia, on the other hand, suffered tremendously, beyond any anticipated side effect of 
independence.  The average incomes in both nations were nearly halved relative to their 
levels during the Soviet era.88  Armenia’s other industries, such as machine tools and 
chemicals, were severely impaired by the lack of a reliable power supply throughout the 
conflict with Azerbaijan.89 Armenia’s industrial responsibilities in the late days of the 
Soviet Union were primarily canned foods, electric engines and textiles.  Azerbaijan, on 
the other hand, was known largely for its production of energy and various types of 
fuels.90  There is little evidence that the countries directly provided each other with these 
products. 
The legacy of the Soviet system prevented the evolution of true interdependence 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan.  Only limited interdependence developed before the 
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outbreak of a war over territory, whose causes predated not only independence but also 
the Soviet Union.  A perusal of World Bank data on trade shows that neither country 
considered the other a top trading partner in 1990.91  The simultaneous evolution of the 
independence movements and the conflict prevented the evolution of any trading 
relationship between the two countries into the 1990s, encouraging further conflict.  Both 
sides fell victim to the characteristic trends of transitional democracies that promote war 
such as nationalistic “prestige strategies” aimed at increasing political capital 
domestically by engaging in an international conflict.92   Regrettably, neither country was 
inhibited by any great prospective losses due to interdependence. 
Despite immediate gains, the longer term consequences of the Kharabakh conflict 
proved to be more damaging to the Armenians than to the Azeris.  The Armenians 
boasted a better army and military strategy, and were fueled by their initial victories.  In 
fact, the Armenians attacked immediately following the election of Ter-Petrosyan.93  
Similarly, shortly after the election of Elchibey in Azerbaijan an attack was launched 
against Armenia.94 Apparently, the people of both nations fully supported the conflict.  
Again, this was largely due to the deteriorating circumstances in and between the 
countries and a lack of true interdependence with each other. 
The rapid disappearance of the established Soviet system truly crippled the 
Armenian economy, forcing nearly everyone to become buyers and sellers of goods.  In 
fact, the entire Soviet system had been “built on interdependence” with other Socialist 
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Republics.95  As the central Soviet economy collapsed, the marketing structure also 
disintegrated.  Thus, the demand for Armenian goods disappeared.  One example of this 
is a large sock factory that the Soviets had established in Armenia.  The raw materials 
necessary for producing the socks were provided from other republics.  Once the 
economy broke down, however, the entire factory became useless, lacking both material 
and demand.96 Most notably, all of the former Soviet Republics have seen a tremendous 
decline in the value of trade and domestic gross domestic product overall.97  Armenia’s 
overall trade sank dramatically, from nearly 4,000 million US dollars in 1991 to 
approximately 200 million US dollars in 1994.  Azerbaijan’s trade also sank from 9,500 
million US dollars to 650 million dollars over the same time period.98
In Armenia, the economic repercussions of the war prone independence 
movements were immediate.  On the fourth of November, 1991, the gas pipeline from 
Russia which entered Armenia through Azerbaijan was closed.  Another Azeri rail 
blockade restricted food and supplies.  Armenia was ultimately forced to ask for UN 
help.99  On March 25, 1992 President Ter-Petrosyan declared an economic state of 
emergency in Armenia.100  The benefits of hindsight, however, may not entirely 
characterize the situation leaders were confronted with at the time.  The tragic earthquake 
of 1988 forced the shutdown of the countries lone nuclear power facility, plunging the 
country back into medieval conditions.101  This completely unanticipated loss of power 
                                                 
95 Miller, p 108   
96 Miller, p 108 
97 Smith, p 161 
98 Smith, p 162, also see table in appendix 
99Twining, p 127 
100 Twining, p 127 
101Miller, p 116)  
 45
was compounded by the blockade, which foiled plans to get power from adjacent 
neighbors through gas powered plants.   
Retrospective analysis by citizens frequently casts the Soviet control of the nation 
as a better time.  Criticism of President Ter-Petroysan is often harsh.  People claim he 
made too many promises without providing for the people’s basic needs.  Following the 
pattern of using a foreign conflict to consolidate control over the country, the president 
had effectively prevented many advances from being achieved.102  It is, however, hard to 
fault the leadership, who only later recognized the numerous challenges that would face 
Armenia during its transition to independence.  One ideal situation seemed to be a 
strengthening of relations with a larger power such as Russia.103  The awareness that 
Armenia, the smallest of the new republics born from the Soviet breakup, needed a 
relationship with a larger power has steadily grown.  During the actual conflict, however, 
the eagerness for conflict was a “bottom up” phenomenon, originating in the will of the 
newly empowered electorate.104  The lack of understanding about the repercussions of 
war and necessity for interdependence fueled the public fervor for war. 
 The widely held Armenian claim that the country “declared only political 
independence” and not economic independence demonstrates the extent to which citizens 
were unaware of the potentially crippling effects breaking with the Soviet Union would 
have.105  Assuming a constant demand for their products, the country confidently pursued 
the conflict with Azerbaijan.  In fact, the first steps toward peace or at least a lasting 
cease fire were established after the complete collapse of the Soviet economy, as both 
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countries recognized their inability to continue waging such a costly war.  Ultimately, 
this resulted in mass demonstrations outside of the Armenian presidential palace on Feb 
6, 1993.106  These frustrations with a failed economy and the inability of those in power 
to deal with it demonstrates the principle that interdependence or the recognition of the 
need for interdependence can lead to changes in public priorities.  Interdependence would 
have acted as a conflict deterrent in this situation. 
  
Armenia and Azerbaijan: Hindsight and Future 
 
 The Soviet Union’s legacy provided no interdependence between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, and the transitional tendencies of these nationalistic countries fueled the war.  
A genuine lack of interdependence continues as the border between the countries remains 
closed.  Although it may be difficult to achieve interdependence now, peace remains an 
even more distant illusion until some relationship can evolve.  This complex case 
demonstrates how a lack of interdependence can lead to a mutually disadvantageous 
conflict.  Another case which demonstrates a higher degree of interdependence will help 
elucidate the effect the presence of interdependence has on conflict in transitional 
democracies. 
 
Argentina and Brazil:  Tensions Suppressed by 
Interdependence 
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 Both Argentina and Brazil were originally mercantilist colonies of European 
powers.  As a result, both specialized in the production of certain goods and commodities 
to support their colonial rulers.  Throughout time, however, both gained independence 
and control over their abundant natural resources.  Brazil eventually had ambitions to 
become a South American super power.  Both countries struggled with each other, 
particularly in the twentieth century as competition intensified.  Despite being 
geographically contiguous and democratizing at the same time, these two countries did 
not go to war with each other, but strengthened their ties.  One of the primary reasons 
conflict was avoided in this situation was the existing trading arrangements and advanced 
interdependence the two countries enjoy to this day.   
 
History of Argentine-Brazilian Relations and 
Democratization 
 
Both Argentine and Brazilian economies were heavily specialized in the colonial 
era, producing whatever was commanded by their respective European powers, Spain and 
Portugal.  The legacy of and potential for conflict was present from the early nineteenth 
century, but Argentina and Brazil never fought a full scale war after the 1840’s.  Over 
time both economies diversified and steadily emerged as two of the most powerful South 
American countries.  With this transition, a rivalry was born with each country trying to 
demonstrate their relative strength in the Southern Cone.  Both countries experienced 
weak forms of democracy earlier in the twentieth century, but they had failed and been 
supplanted by military dictatorships.  Strategic decisions were made by the autocratic 
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regimes in both countries that set the foundation for an internationally peaceful and 
interdependent transition to democracy by both countries. 
During the late 1820s, there was a full scale war between Argentina and Brazil 
resulting from border disagreements concerning Uruguay.  The Brazilians were very 
anxious as Argentina was espousing expansionism and the distance from the capital made 
the southern border particularly vulnerable.107  Eventually several powers aligned to 
defend the sovereignty of Uruguay, and the conflict was ended by the 1840s.108  To 
prevent further conflict, the British created Uruguay as a buffer state between Brazil and 
Argentina.109  Although the existence of Uruguay isolated Argentina and Brazil to some 
extent, they still shared a smaller common border and continued to interact frequently.  In 
fact, just a few decades later, in the 1860s, Argentina and Brazil allied to fight the 
Paraguayans.110  
Brazil was one of the most important colonies for Portugal, providing sugar, 
coffee, gold and rubber.111  In 1889 the colonial ties were broken and Brazil became a 
republic.  A long series of rulers presided over the country, often establishing hierarchical 
structures of governance.  The Argentine export economy itself was still based largely on 
traditional commodities; meat, wool and cereals.112  Argentines developed a strong sense 
of identity that was distinct from other South Americans, and would provide a basis for 
regional rivalry with the other local power in Brazil.113  Similar to Brazil, the Argentine 
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government was dominated by “strong men” and military dictatorships, particularly in the 
twentieth century. 
The presence of the Germans in Argentina and the escalation of the First World 
War set off a small arms race between the two countries.114  During the Second World 
War, similar events took place.  The Brazilian leadership feared that Argentina was trying 
to dominate the Southern Cone’s resources and establish Buenos Aires as the primary 
port in the region.115  Extensive plans were made in order to determine how to best 
conduct a war with Argentina, and relations with the United States expanded.  
Interestingly, Argentina was able to thwart the sale of six obsolete destroyers by the 
United States to Brazil merely by raising strong objections.  This boosted the tension 
between the two countries, encouraging Brazil to industrialize as quickly as possible.116 
Though the two did not fight during the Second World War, external events increased the 
rivalry and revealed underlying tensions. 
The Brazilians helped fight alongside the United States in the Second World War, 
emerging as the dominant military power in Latin America.117  In fact, one of the reasons 
that Brazil declared war on the axis was to win recognition from the United States that it 
was the most powerful nation in South America.118  This served to cool the tense 
relationship with Argentina, which was considered far less of a threat by Brazilians who 
had proved their military might in combat.  Furthermore, the superior size of the 
population and the territory of Brazil convinced many that it was the strongest power in 
the Southern Cone.  Brazil went on to be dominated by a military dictatorship which 
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came to power in 1964 and steadily expanded its control.  The Congress of Brazil was 
closed in 1968, and the military ruled almost absolutely until the return of civilian 
government in 1985.119
The “Brazilian miracle” occurred in the 1960s and 1970s as the economy grew at 
a roaring rate of approximately 10 percent annually.120  This boom was led by chemicals, 
machinery and metallurgy, electrical and communication equipment and transportation 
equipment, and attracted much foreign investment.121 Following the economic miracle, 
the Brazilian economy was beset by a recession in the early 1980s.  A rise in international 
interest rates compounded the woes of the country and pressures began to mount for a 
change of government.122
The military dictatorship that had ruled the country was steadily crumbling, and 
democracy was restored in 1985 with the Electoral College declaring Tancredo Neves the 
President.  He collapsed and died soon after the election, however, and was succeeded by 
Jose Sarney, who would remain president for five years.123  Interestingly, Neves had been 
staunchly opposed to the military regime, while Sarney was a military “yes man” who did 
not reflect the same values.124  Regardless, the people had freely elected their first 
president in nearly two decades without military intervention. 
Democratization continued throughout the late 1980s and Brazil adopted a new 
federal constitution in 1988.125  This document empowered the regions while still leaving 
the national government in control of social programs.  Furthermore, the 1989 election 
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marked the first time the Brazilians had directly elected their leader without an electoral 
college since 1960.126  The transition to democracy was peaceful but drawn out in Brazil.  
Many claim that democratization was only complete with the direct election of Fernando 
Collor in 1989.  Previous elections had been carried out through an indirect system that 
empowered the military generals.127  Although the new government was riddled with 
corruption, the trend towards democracy and away from authoritarian rule clearly began 
and succeeded in the 1980s. 
The Brazilian economy has diversified since the colonial era, though it still relies 
on a steady export of raw materials.  For example, redwood and mahogany remain key 
exports to date.128  Coffee, sugar, and gold still continue to be important, but relatively 
less so than in previous decades.  Industrialization brought consumer goods and a 
successful armaments industry to Brazil in the mid twentieth century, and the country 
thrived despite immense disparities in wealth.  Brazil’s promising economy led to heavy 
foreign investment that ultimately became problematic for the country.  Approaching the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) repeatedly during the early 1980s to request relief for 
their debts, Brazil was only able to begin paying off its debt at the cost of domestic 
stability.  Domestic economic policy was subjected to IMF requirements, which 
destabilized the economy as a whole.  Inflation and wages rose dramatically as the 
military leadership turned over control of the government to civilians.129
In Argentina, The Peronists had come to power after the Second World War and 
installed a military dictatorship that directly influenced Argentine policy until the 1980s, 
                                                 
126 Levine, p 139 
127 Rocha, p 39 
128 Rocha, p 45 
129 Rocha, p 49 
 52
and with a legacy that continues to be an influential factor in Argentine political culture.  
By the 1970s, however, the public discontent with the regime was becoming steadily 
stronger.  In the 1980s, this led to the eventual return of power to civilians.  The 
dictatorship of Leopoldi Galtieri was fundamentally weakened by his loss of the conflict 
in the Falkland Islands.  The loss of this war in 1982 precipitated numerous public 
protests against the regime, essentially forcing the military to permit a return to civilian 
rule.130  Unlike previous attempts at democratization that had only been nominally 
successful, this transition allowed Raul Alfonsin and the Radical party to come to power 
while many expected the Peronists and military sympathizers to continue their rule.131  
This time the transition from autocracy to democracy was genuine.  
 
Argentine and Brazilian Interdependence: Preempting 
Conflict 
 
By the 1960s, Brazil was Argentina’s second most important supplier of 
imports.132  The Latin American Free Trade Agreement encouraged and promoted a 
considerable rise in inter-regional trade, particularly between Argentina and Brazil.133  
After the 1960s, the Brazilians also began to absorb more of the exports from Argentina, 
which had previously dealt largely with the British.134  In 1980, a further association for 
Latin American integration was founded (ALADI), which served to tighten relations 
between Argentina and Brazil.  In particular, the group focused on working out tariff 
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agreements to ease trade.135  While some contend that the treaties of the 1980s 
represented nothing more than diplomatic intentions, the existence of such treaties 
demonstrates the extent to which the idea of interdependence can be an effective 
deterrent from war.136  Mullins notes that “[t]he rapprochement with Argentina had 
begun before the military’s departure from power”.137  As such, the existence of 
interdependence or at the very least the awareness of its value contributed to the 
elimination of any potential hostilities between the two countries. 
Both countries’ extensive Atlantic shorelines enabled them to trade freely with 
other countries, rather than being solely dependent on each other.138  Yet they still 
maintained friendly relations during their transitions to democracy.  While Brazil 
conducts considerable business with the United States, the fear of a complete dependence 
on the US has led it to value interaction with Argentina.  For example, though auto part 
exports to Argentina only amount to 6.1 percent of all Brazilian exports, Argentina ranks 
behind only the US and Germany in terms of importers of such parts.139  The Brazilian 
economy around the time of democratization produced primarily machinery, metals and 
chemicals, many of which were exported to Argentina.140 Approximately ten percent of 
Argentine exports were consumed by Brazil in both 1978 and 1986.  Furthermore, a 
similar proportion of Argentina’s imports arrived from Brazil, depicting how 
interdependent both countries were prior to democratization.141
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The reconciliation of the two newly democratic countries was aided by their 
ability to look beyond their individual aims.  Both acknowledged that hostility in the 
Southern Cone would discourage foreign investment.142  Following democratization and 
the return to civilian rule, both countries signed a bilateral treaty which emphasized the 
importance of trade policy and the betterment of the lives of citizens.143  The virtually 
immediate signing of the Iguacu Declaration, which proposed a study of the relations 
between the countries, following Brazilian democratization in 1985 signaled a desire for 
even closer contact between the countries.144
Argentine-Brazilian relations throughout the twentieth century demonstrate 
considerable competition as the two vied for regional dominance.  The Brazilians, in an 
attempt to use their significant territory and population, often pursued relations with the 
United States in an effort to become a world power.145  However, the goal of attaining 
such status requires regional involvement, and has encouraged Brazil to pursue increased 
relations with Argentina. Brazil and Argentina are the primary economic powers in the 
southern cone, yet both have primarily traded with the northern hemisphere.  Brazil’s 
regional trade amounts to approximately five percent of their total trade; while 
Argentina’s intraregional trade is about fifteen percent of the total.146  These factors are 
far less than other area countries, which depend heavily on Argentina and Brazil.  As 
larger countries, however, Brazil and Argentina recognize their mutual need for local 
trading partners. 
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Some might claim that the transitions to democracy in Argentina and Brazil were 
accompanied by amicable relations between the two countries due to their common 
legacy of overcoming military rule.  While this argument is appealing, it does not account 
for the continued strengthening of the relationship when the Peronists did return to power 
in 1989.  This time as democratically elected officials, they still sought to expand their 
relationship with Brazil, rather than pursue their goals through aggression.  Furthermore, 
the vestiges of military rule still dominated the domestic Brazilian agenda for nearly half 
a decade following democratization. 
The process of democratization in Brazil was very different than in Argentina. In 
Brazil the government remained under “military tutelage” for several years before 
becoming completely run by civilians.  Furthermore, as no military crises had 
precipitated the transition, the country steadily democratized without completely ousting 
the military.  The transition to democracy in Brazil was far gentler than that in Argentina, 
as it entailed a steady weaning of military influence.  The first cabinet included six 
general officers on duty, and only subsequent governments became fully regulated by 
civilians.147  The rise of free market ideals, ambitions of regional leadership and 
economic development all contributed to Brazil’s democratization process.148  These 
factors serve as a number of the pre conditions that can encourage a peaceful transition to 
democracy by slowly weaning elites, in this case the military, of their power.  Even   
without a complete purge of military officials from the government, the Brazilians were 
prepared and enthusiastic about expanding their economic relationship with Argentina. 
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The democratic government in Argentina inherited an economy in complete 
disequilibrium when is assumed power in 1983.  The grounds for this colossal instability 
were two fold; not only had the nations confidence been shaken by the loss of the 
Falklands campaign, but the staggering foreign debt was putting the economy on the 
brink of hyperinflation.  As the government sought to pay back both national and private 
debts, the system struggled forward, and the Radical Party came to power.149  
Consequently, the political democratization movement in Argentina was heavily 
supported by the business community.  Largely because of the Peronist legacy of 
intervention, the Radical Party was considered an entrepreneurial leadership, and was 
supported for their first years of power in the newly established democracy.150  
Consequently, overall support for trade liberalization increased. 
The Argentine democratization predated the Brazilian transition and encouraged 
continued peaceful relations between the two countries by establishing a diplomatic 
rather than militaristic tone.  Following the ouster of the military from government, the 
Argentine’s dissociated themselves as much as possible from the military.  The loss in the 
South Atlantic War over the Falklands cost the military their prestige and almost all of 
their lingering institutional power.  Military spending was cut by nearly half between 
1983 and 1984.151  The strengthening of relations with Brazil was both a strategic and 
essential decision.  By making the ministries dedicated to diplomacy, commerce and 
trade more important, the Argentine government removed the emphasis from military 
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might.  Furthermore, the Argentine identity had been irreparably damaged by the legacy 
of the generals, and leaders sought refuge in a reinsertion into the international system.152   
In Brazil, the transition to democracy also coincided with major macro economic 
imbalances.153  The change was fueled by many groups who had been suppressed 
throughout the years by the military dictatorship, but agitated for redistribution of 
resources once democracy was instituted.154  An acute awareness of the need for regional 
interdependence has pervaded recent Brazilian policy.  Tourism between countries has 
soared, and in 1998 Brazil declared that it would make Spanish a mandatory language in 
schools.  The decision was reciprocated when several thousand Argentinean teachers 
enrolled in courses to learn how to teach Portuguese.155 Both countries recognized that 
operating within an international system would reinforce the democratic model, 
particularly within the Southern Cone.156
Many politically potent groups within both Argentine and Brazilian societies 
successfully campaigned for increased interdependence.  One profound reason for 
cooperation at the governmental level arose from the geographic de facto 
interdependence that arose from shared borders and the necessity for using hydroelectric 
power on the waterways between Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay.  The desire to 
strengthen their international position by forming a reliable trade union was echoed in 
both countries policies.  Beyond the governments, which had political and economic 
gains in sight for macroeconomic policy, smaller private groups acted on their own 
interests to support the bilateral agreements between the two countries.   
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Although some of the private sector firms were weary of the neo-liberal policies 
the two countries were adopting, they eventually began to support the initiatives for 
increased interdependence.157  The wariness eventually gave way in both countries to a 
consensus that economic recovery and regional stability would best be accomplished by 
emphasizing interdependence rather than rivalry.  These conclusions manifested 
themselves with the increased support for bilateral agreements from groups within 
society.   
In Brazil, one of the most influential groups at the time of democratization was 
the computer industry.  During the years of the inception of a computer program, the 
dollar sales of the industry grew from 2 percent of the total to nineteen percent of the 
total.  By 1983 over eighteen thousand individuals worked for more than one hundred 
computer companies.158  The industry was regulated by a national panel called the 
“Secretaria Especial de Informatica” or SEI, which was heavily influenced by 
government actors as well as the computer industry itself.159  The close ties with IBM 
enabled the country to become less dependent on foreign computers and technology.  
Coupled with an aborted Argentine computer development project, the interests of the 
Brazilian companies in the Argentine market were increased.  This culminated in a 1986 
agreement that identified “informatics” as a key area of cooperation between the two 
countries. 
Another arena in which Brazilians had a particular interest in gaining from the 
Argentineans is with respect to nuclear energy.  While the Argentinean’s had developed a 
sustainable nuclear system by the 1980s, the Brazilian’s were struggling to “catch up” 
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under intense pressure from the citizenry, and particularly the military interests.  Instead 
of provoking a conflict, this precipitated efforts towards collaboration, both for security 
reasons and to encourage the interchange of information and consequently business.160  A 
1980 treaty began the process by acknowledging a need to share information, and by 
1986 the countries agreed to join nuclear development projects and exports.161  The 
motivations for interdependence were fostered largely by scientists and technocrats, who 
used their authority and expertise to entrench themselves within the government and 
promote their ideal policies.162  Ultimately, these pressures led to increased cooperation 
between Argentina and Brazil. 
By 1986, the largest Argentine companies and groups firmly supported the trade 
relations.  One generic group that considered economic cooperation as vital to its interests 
was the Argentine wheat farmers.  This faction, that comprised nearly 30 percent of the 
total exports to Brazil by the late 1980s, eagerly awaited closer ties between the nations, 
securing a market for their product.163  Several of the large individual private sector 
companies and corporations also desired an improved relationship with Brazil.  Three 
notable companies that encouraged the tightening of relations with Brazil were Perez 
Companc, Bunge and Born, and Techint.   
Perez Companc was an Argentinean oil and energy company.  The significant 
interest in expanding into Brazil’s markets and oil reserves caused the company to 
support the bilateral agreements.  Interestingly, the company was ultimately sold to a 
Brazilian corporation, Petrobas, in 2002 making the Gregorio Companc the sole 
                                                 
160 Adler, p 82 
161 Adler, p 82 
162 Adler, p 83 
163 Manzetti, p 122 
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Argentine Billionaire.164   Bunge and Born was a grain and oilseed trader with an annual 
turnover of nearly thirteen billion dollars.  The two owner families had diversified their 
investments to include industry in both Argentina and Brazil.  There interests in the 
promotion of increased cooperation were for easing of their business management and 
assurance of continued expansion. 
Techint, the largest manufacturer of seamless steel pipes in Latin America, was 
also deeply interested in cooperation between the two countries, which held the promise 
of increased bilateral energy development.  In fact, their policy by the 1980s was 
decidedly expansionist: “In the mid-1980s the Techint Group undertook a major, export-
oriented expansion of the Campana seamless tube mill, and acquired Argentine welded 
pipe maker Siat”.165  There interest in opening the relationship between Brazil and 
Argentina was lucrative as the company has continued to grow to date.   
A further group that stood to benefit from a preferential relationship between 
Brazil and Argentina was the car manufacturers.  In Brazil, the auto industry was fairly 
well developed, and had significant ties with the national government.166  The 
establishment of the government as a primary player in the auto industry enabled more 
pressure to be put on the political process to promote increased trade with local 
neighbors.167  Brazil had established some protectionist measures against the foreign 
companies which threatened to dominate their auto import market, but these measures did 
not apply to Argentina, which was viewed as a profitable partner.  International 
Companies, such as Dana Corporation, increased their holdings in both countries 
                                                 
164 Forbes.com (http://www.forbes.com/lists/2006/10/6JFL.html) visited March 12, 2007 
165 Techint – History (http://www.techintgroup.com/group/en/history/default.aspx) visited March 22, 2007 
166 Brazil's Auto Industry (http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/42/037.html) visited March 22, 2007 
167 Thomas (review), p 170 
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following the initiation of tighter trade relations.168  Although most of the industry 
remained in Brazil, Argentinean companies contributed parts.  This decision to pursue 
integrationist policies benefited Brazil, who exported 67% of their automobiles to 
Argentina by 1993.169  Furthermore, the industrial capacity of the countries was largely 
based on their auto manufacturing, which attracted international investment due to the 
large potential new markets for car sales.170  The development of MERCASOR enabled 
the countries to cooperate to exploit economies of scale and reduce duplicate 
manufacturing plants.171
 The newly elected governments of both countries, sensitive to the demands of the 
people, instituted increasingly more agreements between each other.  In fact, their early 
advocacy of regional trade liberalization had laid the foundation for the rapid 
development of sophisticated interdependence between the countries.  As private sector 
interests became congruent with governmental aims, all parties were pleased, and the 
liberalization policies were widely accepted.  Furthermore, the confluence of some 
international corporations interests with those of groups within the state and the 
governments themselves provided the final impetus for increased interdependence. 
Selcher, writing amidst the democratic transitions of both countries, thought that 
their rivalry was finally turning into a form of collaboration, albeit somewhat 
competitive.  He identified several areas that were predicted to be necessary for the 
relationship between the two countries to be considered “economic interdependence”.  
They included an increase in joint research and investment, trade, and flows of 
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169 Brazil's Auto Industry (http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/42/037.html) visited March 22, 2007 
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information.172  Despite some downward trends in trade caused by economic hardship 
and the Falklands conflict, the general trajectory of overall trade between Argentina and 
Brazil has been upward,173 further corroborating the belief that the countries are steadily 
becoming more interdependent. 
The need for interdependence was recognized by both nations prior to 
democratization.  The beginnings of a true rapprochement between the countries began in 
1980 with presidential visits to Buenos Aires.174  These visits were the first since 1935.  
A weakening in the relationship between Brazil and the United States also fueled genuine 
considerations of cooperation, as Argentina was less suspicious that Brazil was operating 
as a surrogate of the United States, or practicing an expansionist agenda.175  The 
Common Market of the South, or MERCASOL, is a vestige of the earliest efforts at 
integration between Argentina and Brazil.  Although Brazil dominates the group, 
producing nearly 65 percent of its total product and often acting unilaterally, the symbolic 
value of the group discourages any member from acting in a hostile manner.176
 
Argentine-Brazilian Horizons 
 
The future of the relationship between Brazil and Argentina looks promising.  
While some Argentineans fear that MERCASOL might lead to an incorporation of 
Argentina into a larger Brazilian dominated economic state, most believe the possibilities 
for effective trade are substantial.  As trade relationships evolve, the possibility of 
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173 See Appendix 2, UN Data 
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175 Mullins, p 86 
176 Machlachlan, p188 
 63
conflict between the two countries becomes increasingly less likely.  The ability of the 
two nations to democratize without an active conflict with each other can largely be 
attributed to concerns about domestic issues at the time of regime change.  Both countries 
were in dire economic and social situations as civilians came back to power.  Another key 
component of the peaceful relationship between Argentina and Brazil remains the 
interdependence that was begun under the military rule of the mid twentieth century.  
This acted as an effective deterrent to war, and was brought about by domestic concerns 
about the viability of the democratic state and economic crises.  Consequently, the goals 
of the Argentine and Brazilian leadership in the 1980s effectively established a system 
which would eventually begin to correct the economic problems in both countries without 
promoting a detrimental and potentially hostile rivalry. 
 
Conclusions: Interdependence as a Pacifist Promoter 
 
 Both the Argentine-Brazilian and Armenian-Azeri cases are informative about the 
nature of the relationship between interdependence and peace in transitional democracies.  
Serving as a preliminary case sample, they corroborate the hypothesis that 
interdependence inhibits the likelihood of conflict during a historically belligerent 
transitional democratization phase.  As aforementioned, their instructive value is boosted 
by the reality of their small and vulnerable status.  Unlike the superpowers, or the 
primary western nations on the eve of either world war, these countries represent a more 
contemporary sample that belies potential realities about fostering democracy around the 
globe.  The legacies of the countries interactions survive today. 
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Without exploring counterfactuals in detail, one could claim that the presence 
substantial of interdependence between Armenia and Azerbaijan could have prevented, or 
at least dampened the war there.  In Armenia, there remains to this day a lack of any 
significant relationship with Azerbaijan.  Some authors assert that ethnic and cultural 
dissimilarities between the two nations have ruled out peace and interaction in the area 
permanently.  In fact, the United States State Department still advises Americans to 
“exercise caution” near the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as sporadic violent 
conflicts continue to occur.177  These lingering effects of earlier conflict demonstrate the 
importance of establishing interdependence as early as possible to prevent or minimize 
conflict.  Instead, a protracted and stubbornly defiant relationship has emerged between 
the countries, indicating little chance of future cooperation. 
Conversely, where an economic relationship had existed prior to the transition to 
democracy, the prospects for peace were significantly higher, as in Argentina and Brazil.  
Though still most reliant on trading partners outside of South America, both countries 
cultivated a significant relationship with each other that has continuously grown 
following their democratization.  In fact, the trade data demonstrates consistent growth 
since the 1980s.178  As both countries recuperated from the economic turbulence of the 
80s, they emerged as strong partners.  While the context of both dyads democratization 
varied, the outcomes were also substantially different, indicating that interdependence 
could act universally as a war inhibitor. 
 Before advancing support of any specific policies, the differences between the 
cases must be illuminated.  The distinctions between the conflicts inform and enrich their 
                                                 
177 US Department of State  (http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1141.html) Visited March 5, 
2007 
178 See UN Trade data, Appendix 2, Table 5 
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relevance.  The environment in which Armenia and Azerbaijan democratized was more 
chaotic than the circumstances in South America, yet precedents for conflict existed in 
both cases.  Furthermore, the instability of Armenia and Azerbaijan could have led to 
more cooperation if the incentive had existed for both the population and the leadership.  
In Argentina and Brazil, the transition came at a time of extraordinary economic 
turbulence.  The grounds for the democratization in both dyads was different, as 
Argentina and Brazil experienced internal changes that led to democratization, while 
Armenia and Azerbaijan were born from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Their 
democratization occurred as an outside power crumbled, and some optimism existed 
about domestic economic policy.  The true nature of interdependence was not as well 
understood in the Transcaucasas as in South America, where countries had already been 
independent, but not totally democratic.   
The push for democracy in South America resulted from discontent with the 
current regime, largely over economic policy, whereas the Transcaucasian case originated 
in attempts to better delineate ethnic regions and maintain identity.  The consequences of 
democratization and the loss of the Soviet Union as an economic transfer hub decimated 
the small economies of Armenia and Azerbaijan, who later admitted they only wanted 
political and not economic independence.  The elites in Armenia and Azerbaijan 
supported conflict while those in Argentina and Brazil were preoccupied with economic 
concerns which actually encouraged them to endorse interdependence.  The presence of 
interdependence encourages further strengthening of relations.  As such, the counter-war 
effects of interdependence in transitional democracies seem to compound over time, 
stabilizing the relationship between the two countries just as their own domestic agenda’s 
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become less turbulent.  This is shown by the steady integration of the Brazilian and 
Argentine economies. 
Groups within society pressured the governments of all involved countries to 
pursue the policies they ultimately chose.  All of these conclusions underscore the value 
of the liberal or neo-liberal position.  The enthusiasm of the people and businesses within 
these countries drove the political process, which in turn affected the economic and 
foreign policy arenas. This does not necessarily disprove the realist position; it merely 
indicates the economic interdependence has a profound impact on peace.  Realists might 
contend that the peace process was in the long term interest of the states, which acted 
without regard to internal demands.  This claim, however, insufficiently addresses the 
case in Argentina and Brazil, where militaristic regimes were steadily cast aside and 
neutralized as private interests became increasingly vocal and encouraged peace and 
integration.  However, as mentioned in the section on the theory of the state, transitional 
democracies seem to be more responsive to the needs of individual groups within society.  
As such, the liberal viewpoint holds more clout when applied to transitional democracies. 
Although this paper demonstrates the finding of a trend in only two cases so far, 
some preliminary policy suggestions may nonetheless be articulated.  Based on the 
evidence from the two cases examined in this paper, however, all policy prescriptions 
underscore the need for interdependence in democratizing countries.  While some have 
expressed concern that liberal policies will lead to the subjugation of public interests to 
private interests in the 21st century179, a benefit from increased interdependence in South 
America between Argentina and Brazil has helped transform a regional rivalry into a 
partnership.  The active participation of private interests and other groups in the political 
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process encouraged the tightening of this relationship.  By contrast, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan were plagued by war as a lack of interdependence failed to mobilize 
significant interest groups against the war. 
Again, Baldwin’s theory of interdependence characterizes the relationships 
between the countries in both cases as that of vulnerability.  For Armenia and Azerbaijan, 
however, the extent of vulnerability interdependence was unknown and significantly less 
at the time of democratization than in Argentina and Brazil, where trade relationships 
predated the democratic transition.180  In these cases, sensitivity interdependence played 
less of a role, as both dyads were more reliant on foreign powers than each others 
monetary policies.  In Argentina and Brazil, however, any destabilization in the Southern 
Cone could deter foreign investment, thus leading to some sensitivity interdependence.  
As aforementioned, the promotion of vulnerability interdependence is likely the best 
route to peace. 
Applying the logic of the cases to policy prescriptions, one can not understate the 
importance of encouraging economic interdependence.  These prescriptions even apply to 
other areas of the world that may not have previously been prone to conflict.  Attention 
should be paid to encouraging geographically contiguous states to have a vested interest 
in the welfare of their neighbors.  Promoting vulnerability interdependence entails 
encouraging countries to see the benefits of their continued cooperation.  This is best 
accomplished by establishing international trade agreements that minimize costs and 
regulations between democratizing countries.  Specifically, international peace 
organizations should endeavor to allow regional preferential trade arrangements to exist, 
particularly in democratizing areas.  Although this might contradict the short term 
                                                 
180 Recall that these terms were defined in the first section of the paper 
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interests of developed and powerful countries, they will benefit in the long term by 
having relations with stable and peaceful democracies.  Internally, this will allow 
businesses to perceive the opportunities cooperation affords them.  Ideally these types of 
policies would be implemented prior to countries democratization, serving as one of 
many preconditions for averting conflict. 
As mentioned, Thompson’s list of rivals is extensive, and many other potential 
cases for further study exist, as well as the beginnings of a dataset for larger samples.  
The Croatian-Serbian conflict could be contrasted to the Armenian-Azeri case to 
determine whether similarities between former socialist republics emerge.  Furthermore, 
Thompson’s list of rivals could be used as the basis of a larger, more encompassing study 
of general trends amongst democratizing countries.  Numerous contemporary cases could 
also be explored through case studies.  This paper reflects only a preliminary study of two 
cases which underscore the conclusion that interdependence bears importance for 
democratizing dyads.  Further research will be needed to conclude if this trend is truly 
universal, and to what extent. 
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Appendix 1- Armenia and Azerbaijan 
 
 
 
Map from De Waal, Thomas. Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War.  New York 
University Press; New York, 2003. 
 
 (Tables 1-4 from http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html)  Visited March 9, 2007 
 
Table 1. Armenia: Output of Major Industrial Products, 1989, 1990, and 1991 
Product 1989 1990 1991 
Automobile tires (in thousands) 1,338 1,009 914 
Cable (in kilometers) 13,772 8,459 7,746 
Canned food (in thousands of cans) 413,119 267,425 181,860 
Carpets (in thousands of square meters) 1,585 1,300 947 
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Cement (in thousands of tons) 1,639 1,466 1,507 
Electric energy (in millions of kilowatt-hours) 12,137 10,377 9,532 
Electric engines 736,490 823,295 700,157 
Leather shoes (in thousands of pairs) 17,952 18,740 11,340 
Natural textile items 90,723 85,473 53,203 
Synthetic fibers (in tons) 10,479 9,351 4,050 
Synthetic rubber (in tons) 39,150 1,141 10,613 
Wine and cognac (in thousands of decaliters) 7,104 4,805 4,852 
Source: Based on information from International Monetary Fund, Armenia, Washington, 
1993, 40.  
Table 2. Armenia: Major Trading Partners, 1990 
 
* In millions of rubles.  
Country Value*  Percentage of Total 
 Emports Imports Exports Imports 
Europe 69 585 66.9 66.8 
Bulgaria 12 67 11.7 7.6 
Britain 3 10 2.9 1.1 
Hungary 6 49 5.8 5.6 
Italy 4 20 3.9 2.3 
Poland 7 84 6.8 9.6 
Romania 4 20 3.9 2.3 
Germany 11 139 10.7 15.8 
Finland 3 22 2.9 2.5 
France 3 27 2.9 3.1 
Czechoslovakia 9 80 8.7 9.1 
Yugoslavia 2 28 1.9 3.2 
Asia 11 148 10.3 16.9 
India 2 25 1.9 2.9 
China 2 24 1.9 2.7 
Japan 1 33 1.0 3.8 
North America 8 98 7.7 11.2 
Cuba 6 51 5.8 5.8 
United States 1 32 1.0 3.6 
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Source: Based on information from World Bank, Statistical Handbook: States of the 
Former USSR, Washington, 1992, 40.  
 
Table 3. Azerbaijan: Output of Selected Industrial Products, 1989, 1990, and 
1991 
(in thousands of tons unless otherwise specified)
Product 1989 1990 1991 
Aviation fuel 114 89 58
Bitumen 167 146 113
Caustic soda 219 160 171
Diesel oil 4,236 3,899 3,635
Electric energy (in millions of kilowatt-hours) 23,300 23,200 23,300
Fuel oil 7,555 6,686 7,207
Jet kerosene 1,519 1,290 1,205
Lubricants 934 818 763
Motor fuel 1,522 1,479 1,174
Naphtha 550 341 427
Petroleum coke 230 179 161
Steel 696 501 462
Sulfuric acid 768 603 552 
Source: Based on information from The Europa World Year Book, 1993, 1, London, 
1993, 443.  
 
Table 4. Azerbaijan: Major Trading Partners, 1990 
Country Value*  Percentage of Total 
 Exports Imports Exports Imports
Europe 286 836 62.7 65.3 
Bulgaria 41 92 9.0 7.2 
Britain 14 12 3.1 0.9
Hungary 27 60 5.9 4.7
Italy 11 54 2.4 4.2
Poland 26 140 5.7 10.9
Romania 16 30 3.5 2.3
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Germany 49 172 10.7 13.4 
Finland 10 39 2.2 3.0 
France 12 22 2.6 1.7
Czechoslovakia 33 109 7.2 8.5
Yugoslavia 11 53 2.4 4.1 
Asia 72 262 15.9 20.5 
India 9 57 2.0 4.5
China 8 28 1.9 2.7
Japan 11 53 2.4 4.1
North America 31 131 6.9 10.2
Cuba 26 67 5.7 5.2
United States 4 39 0.9 3.0 
* In millions of rubles.  
Source: Based on information from World Bank, Statistical Handbook: States of the 
Former USSR, Washington, 1992, 68. 
 
Table 5* 
 
From  Smith, Graham. The Post-Soviet States : Mapping the Politics of Transition.  Oxford University 
Press; New York, 1999. 
*Note: The CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) was formed by post-soviet states to encourage 
trade and economic prosperity.   
 
Unfortunately, UN Trade data was available for Armenia and Azerbaijan only after 1996.  
See Appendix 2 for the UN trade data for Argentina and Brazil. 
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Appendix 2 – Brazil and Argentina 
 
Table 1: Brazilian Exports 
 
From Willumsen 
 
 
Table 2: Argentine Foreign Trade Distribution 
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From Canitrot 
 
 
 
Table 3: Extent of Brazil's Borderline Shared by Neighboring Countries and 
the Atlantic Ocean 
  Extent of Border 
Neighboring Countries and Atlantic Ocean In Kilometers As Percentage of Total
Neighboring countries     
Argentina  1,263 5.5 
Bolivia  3,126 13.5 
Colombia  1,644 7.1 
French Guiana  655 2.8 
Guyana  1,606 7.0 
Paraguay  1,339 5.8 
Peru  2,995 13.0 
Suriname  593 2.6 
Uruguay  1,003 4.3 
Venezuela  1,495 6.5 
Total neighboring countries  15,719 68.0 
Atlantic Ocean  7,367 31.9 
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TOTAL  23,086 100.0 
Source: Based on information from the World Wide Web home page of the Fundação Instituto Brasileiro 
de Geografia e Estatística (http://www.ibge.gov.br), Diretoria de Geociências, Departamento de 
Cartografia, Rio de Janeiro, 1996. 
 
Table 4: Brazilian Foreign Trade by Major Product, Selected Years, 1978-96 
(in millions of United States dollars) 
Product 1978 1982 1986 1990 1996 
Exports           
Primary products           
Coffee  1,947 1,858 2,006 1,102 1,719 
Iron ore  1,028 1,847 1,615 2,409 2,693 
Soybeans  1,050 1,619 1,253 1,609 3,743 
Sugar  196 259 141 289 936 
Other  1,757 2,655 2,265 3,342 3,094 
Total primary products  5,978 8,238 7,280 8,751 12,185
Manufactured products           
Iron and steel  172 795 1,179 1,644 2,574 
Machinery  566 1,191 1,471 2,474 2,211 
Orange juice  333 575 678 1,468 1,389 
Transportation equipment  828 1,718 1,568 2,181 2,464 
Other  4,605 7,407 9,999 14,318 26,103
Total manu- factured products 6,504 11,686 14,895 22,085 34,741
Other  177 251 173 578 821 
Total exports  12,659 20,175 22,348 31,414 47,747
Imports           
Chemicals  893 1,003 1,352 1,691 6,677 
Fertilizers  309 239 325 319 426 
Fuels and lubricants  4,483 10,457 3,540 5,363 6,906 
Grain  702 848 823 251 2,105 
Other  7,296 6,848 8,004 12,782 37,172
Total imports  13,683 19,395 14,044 20,406 53,286
TRADE BALANCE  -1,024 780 8,304 11,008 -5,539
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Source: Based on information from Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Conjuntura Econômica [Rio de Janeiro], 
various issues; and Fundação Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, Estatísticas históricas do 
Brasil, Rio de Janeiro, 1964-97. 
Table 5:  Import Export Data for Brazil and Argentina, 1980-1995 
 
Imports of goods by partner, US$      
Country  Argentina Brazil 
  from from 
Year Brazil Argentina 
1980 1072327552   
1981 893331904   
1982 687710784   
1983 666799808 373211296
1984 831194816 538614208
1985 611516096 493115264
1986 691293248 782326336
1987 819228416 605691392
1988 966234112 738635712
1990 715140800 1514198784
1991 1531854049 1746457344
1992 3338779392 1832919424
1993 3568422400 2816116736
1994 4285886464 3828394496
1995 4175946240 5749807104
      
      
Exports of goods by partner, US$      
Country  Argentina Brazil 
  from from 
Year Brazil Argentina 
1980 1072327552   
1981 893331904   
1982 687710784   
1983 666799808 373211296
1984 831194816 538614208
1985 611516096 493115264
1986 691293248 782326336
1987 819228416 605691392
1988 966234112 738635712
1990 715140800 1514198784
1991 1531854049 1746457344
1992 3338779392 1832919424
1993 3568422400 2816116736
1994 4285886464 3828394496
1995 4175946240 5749807104
      
Source: UN Trade Data     
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(http://unstats.un.org/unsd/trade/default.htm) 
Data not Available for 1989     
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